ثورة يوليو الأمريكية علاقة عبد الناصر بالمخابرات الأمريكية — الصفحة ٤٨١

٤٨١ 546 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952-1954, VOLUME IX lowing). Adoption proposal would involve abandonment our present policy of basing area defense on northern tier concept and Turk-Pakistan pact. We need particularly precise information re manner and timing association western powers and Turkey and Pakistan and nature any moves contemplated on Israel issue. Our attitude necessarily will depend largely on whether Arabs prepared reverse previous anti-Israel orientation Arab League and we there fore especially interested Nuri statement one function new pact would be prepare for peace with Israel. Does Egypt understand ar- rangements in same manner as Nuri and is she willing proceed at this time? When approached by Egyptians (Baghdad's 105) Embassy Cairo should endeavor obtain details but refrain from indicating US atti- tude. 5 Embassy London requested query Foreign Office. SMITH Dated Aug 21, not printed. It concerned a conversation with Nuri Said on the Iraqi-Egyptian talks (674.87/8-2154) Telegram 107 from Baghdad, Aug 23, reported Salem said time would be needed to erase Egyptian suspicions of Great Britain, while Nuri Said claimed he expected Great Britain and the United States to be associated with the pact from the begin- ning (674.87/8-2334) Telegram 244 from Cairo, Aug. 23, suggested differences exist. ed between the Egyptian and Iraqi interpretations on the nature and extent of agreement reached, and had suggested caution until the situation was clarified. 1674.87/8-2354) Document 223 Telegram 250 from Cairo, Aug. 27, reported that Salem and Nuri Said did inter- pret the Sersank conversations differently. Salem had not been authorized to commit the Government of Egypt to anything, and Nasser was not prepared to go along with Iraq in cooperating with the West to the extent that Salem had appar ently indicated that Egypt might (67487/8-2754) Telegram 1113 from London, Sept. 1, reported some confusion about what had happened at Sersank. On the basis of available information, the Foreign Office was inclined to welcome the Iraqi-Egyptian proposals on the grounds that a lessening of tension between Iraq and Egypt was a good sign. They considered it encouraging that non-Westerners were suggesting a regional organization that would invite Western participation. A British official commented that the Suez settlement had made Great Britain more optimistic about building on the Arab League and less fa- vorable to the northern tier concept, although it did not necessarily consider the two inconsistent. (780.5/9-154) الوثيقة رقم ٢٢٦ بالهامش : توضيح من السفارة الأمريكية بالقاهرة بأن صلاح سالم لم يكن محولا بالموافقة على أكثر تفاؤلاً بالتعاون مع حلف بغداد وتصريح لمسئول بريطان بأن بريطانيا بعد اتفاقية ) الجامعة العربية وتخلت من فكرة الحزام الشمالي. ثورة يوليو الأمريكية - ١٦
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