and indeed Umon of
a
Nine may well
still not EMERGE
мище
the end of
the day.
and
•presume? interesty
the Abu Dhabi meeting of advisers, it looks equally or more likely that it may adip swing be quite some time before the
The
present fluid UAD situation congeals Iranian decision in April to relax immediate public pressure has greatly helped to improve the atmosphere and the prospects for
The
co-operation with the Arab States, notably Saudi Arabia. But it is exaggerating for effect for Afshar to say that the picture which has become gloomy was previously so bright. Iranian decision to relax public pressure was in fact in Iran's interest. The Iranians would make a great mistake if they were to reverse the process of rapprochement with King Faisal simply on the basis of anticipating a hardening buypothetical of the UAE concept which is still some-way ye£f. HYPOTHETICAL 3. The Iranian relaxation of their immediate
pressure has not reduced the underlying difficulty of their claims which remains as before. In this context it has become plain that Iranian tactics are directed towards dealing with H.M.G. rather than the Arab States in the hope of inducing H.M.G. to impose a settlement acceptable to Iran irrespective of Arab views
This may lie behind the Shah's apparent deferment of a visit to King Faisal until the autumn. When, as we hope shortly, we discuss with the Shah through H.M. Ambassador possible methods of dealing with the Iranian
territorial claims, particularly the
small disputed islands, we shall have to make it
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ص ٤٨٢