من الوثائق البريطانية في تاريخ الخليج والجزيرة العربية - إبراهيم — الصفحة ٤٨٢

and indeed Umon of a Nine may well still not EMERGE мище the end of the day. and •presume? interesty the Abu Dhabi meeting of advisers, it looks equally or more likely that it may adip swing be quite some time before the The present fluid UAD situation congeals Iranian decision in April to relax immediate public pressure has greatly helped to improve the atmosphere and the prospects for The co-operation with the Arab States, notably Saudi Arabia. But it is exaggerating for effect for Afshar to say that the picture which has become gloomy was previously so bright. Iranian decision to relax public pressure was in fact in Iran's interest. The Iranians would make a great mistake if they were to reverse the process of rapprochement with King Faisal simply on the basis of anticipating a hardening buypothetical of the UAE concept which is still some-way ye£f. HYPOTHETICAL 3. The Iranian relaxation of their immediate pressure has not reduced the underlying difficulty of their claims which remains as before. In this context it has become plain that Iranian tactics are directed towards dealing with H.M.G. rather than the Arab States in the hope of inducing H.M.G. to impose a settlement acceptable to Iran irrespective of Arab views This may lie behind the Shah's apparent deferment of a visit to King Faisal until the autumn. When, as we hope shortly, we discuss with the Shah through H.M. Ambassador possible methods of dealing with the Iranian territorial claims, particularly the small disputed islands, we shall have to make it ٤٨٠
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