The point to note is that geographers, whether deductivists or inductivists, have in the main been ready to circumscribe the status of law to many of their findings. But according to Harvey this is justifiable since "If we employ very rigid criteria for distinguishing scientific laws, then we can scarcely expect geog- raphical statements to achieve such a (scientific) status." (Harvey, 1969, 107). By "using less rigid criteria”, he continued, “the identification of law in geog- raphy becomes partly a matter of our own willingness to regard geographical phenomena as if they were subject to universal laws, even when they are patently not so governed". The implication of such stance is that if it was not possible to show that geographical phenomena were subject to universal laws, there was still some values in regarding them as if they were (Gregory, 1978, 40).
This sort of injuction emanates from an instrumentalist conception of sci- ence, hence, the rise of instrumentalism as yet another version of positivism in human geography. Instrumentalism focuses on the utility of theories as devices in science, and the propositions of science are evaluated according to the suc- cess of their predictions alone. Whether the theoretical assumptions are invalid or unrealistic is immaterial. It is the end result which matters. (Gregory, 1978, 41). Thus, instrumentalism appears to compromise the absolute certainty and truth required by Comtean original positivism (i.e,le precis). However, It should be noticed that instrumentalism is, nevertheless, predicated on an empiricist conception of knowledge (le reel) and holds to a technical consep- tion of science (l'utile), In upholding these two precepts positivism achieves its aspiration. The technical conception of science does not only divorce "means" from "ends", nor just distinguishing "policy-relevant" from "policy-forming" contributions. What is subtly implicated is that "we understand a state of affairs only to the extent that we have the knowledge of what to do in order to contrtol it'. (Fay, 1975, 40).
Values and Epistemology in Islamic Geography
The conclusion that we are forced to accept about positivist explanation in geography is that it can no longer sustain the pressure for a critrical scrutiny of he geography as a genuine source of knowledge concerning man and the way organizes his space. To Gregory, the positivist epistemology must give way to what he terms as a "critical social science" (Gregory, 1978, 76-77), whose epis- temology involves a structural explanation, which locates explanatory struc- tures outside the domain of immediate experience and which problematizes the relationship between theory and observation: a reflexive explanation. which
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