28
and diplomacy and the exhaustion of alternatives seemed to have usurped the place of military action in the thinking of our author.
Paradoxically it is in the relationship of this last point to the military thinking of the Middle Ages that the work makes its soundest contribution. All later military historians have looked upon the disincli- nation of the Muslim armies to engage in immediate battle, and their super-sensitive cautiousness and their appeals to stratagems and cun- ning and trickery to avoid open battle as derogatory aspects of Eastern warfare. In taking the modern military historians and theorists to task for their inept handling of warfare during the Crusades, Professor Smail
wrote:
"The interpretation of the events of one age in the light of the assumptions and prejudices of another can never produce satis- factory history, and the story of medieval military methods told wholly or principally in terms of battle is very far from complete. It was not an age when commanders in war consciously applied strategic doctrine, but they were well aware of the risks involved in giving battle, in adverse circumstances they prepared to refuse it. Yet even when they decided against combat, conditions in the Latin states were such that by keeping their army in being in the neighborhood of the enemy they achieved important military objects." 15
In an adjoining footnote, he points out that the most widely influential military theorist during the Middle Ages was Vegetius, and that he "more than once stated that battle was an uncertain business, to be rejected in favor of other means unless circumstances were favorable.” 16
Smail believes that both sides during the Crusades fought along principles of "Eastern" warfare, i.e., erection and maintenance of for- tified strategic points, a small army ever ready and practiced in quick forays, the avoidance of open battles, per se, until the last minute. His work points out with singular clarity that the Latin armies lost or were put at serious disadvantage only when they veered from these principles as a result of rash leadership, personal vendettas, or inaccurate or The chivalric impetuosity incomplete intelligence about the enemy.
(15) R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (Cambridge: 1956), p. 15. For the shortcomings of the historians of crusading warfare see Chapter One of Smail's work, and cf. the first paragraphs of this introduction.
(16) Smail, op. cit., p. 15, note 2.
KTBe_0130423 — ص ٣٦