التقرير الثقافي العدد السابع عشر — الصفحة ١٤٣

THE MIDDLE EAST 89 matters into their own hands and to change the status quo. Jordan shared this desire to engage in the peace process because King Hussein had also discredited himself by his opposition to the liberation of Kuwait. The peace process provided the only way for him to refurbish his relationship with Washington and seek its help in reestablishing the finan- cial support of his erstwhile gulf Arab backers. The fifth element was Israeli flexibility. Prime Minister Shamir had previously opposed an international conference process. with Soviet involvement and PLO association with the But now he had every incentive to be more flexible about the procedures for negotiations, as long as he secured his basic objective of direct negotiations with the Arab states and Palestinians from the territories without a prior commitment to territorial concessions. The final and decisive-element was American influence. All the regional actors sought the good graces and partnership of the United States. For so long they had been unwilling to say "yes" to peace with each other, but now they could no longer afford to say "no" to the Americans. The key to progress lay in the quick exploitation of the window of opportunity created by the Gulf War. Accordingly, President Bush dispatched his secretary of state to the region in March to sound out the parties. That trip and seven more shuttles produced evidence of all six elements at work. Moscow followed Washington's lead in the peace process, literally speaking from the same talking points. In nine months of diplomacy there was not a single instance when the Soviet Union deviated from the American position. Syria began its engagement in customary fashion, insisting on procedural arrangements that would have given it a veto over the negotiating positions of other Arab parties. But in July, after laborious coaxing by Secretary Baker and an assurance from President Bush that the United States viewed the Golan Heights as occupied territory, Assad accepted the American proposals for convening negotiations without con- ditions or amendments. His willingness to accept arrange- ments that would bring Syria face-to-face with Israel in bilat- eral negotiations for the first time—and without any control over the other Arabs-was a clear indication of how Syria's circumstances had changed. Saudi Arabia welcomed the secretary of state on his first visit with a commitment to engage in the process and support
ص ١٤٣

النص مستخرج آليًّا من صور الكتاب، وقد يقع فيه خطأ.