مستخلصات رسائل السعوديين لدرجة الدكتوراة — الصفحة ٢٣٧

Social Sciences 83 where the number of oligopolists in n, >2; small producers n2 in number are in- troduced in the oligopoly model as followers; (b) the demand side character- ized as <<concentrated oligopsony-with leadership,>> here a Couront-type olig- opsony model is developed, the oligopsonists m1 > 2 in number were viewed collectively, as a leader in relation to the small buyers m2 in number; (c) vertical integration; and (d) the percentage depletion allowance. The method of de- creasing abstraction was used in the theoretical development. The group equili- brium of each side of the market is studied while assuming perfect competition on the other side, no vertical integration, and no depletion allowance. Next, market equilibrium was analyzed; both sides were brought together while none was characterized as being perfectly competitive. The determina- tion of total quantity and the corresponding price are discussed assuming that all buyers are one buyer and that all sellers are one seller. The concept of the <<net>> marginal revenue curve of the raw material is developed and viewed as the demand curve for the raw material (crude oil). Group equilibria and market equilibrium are then brought together in an intergrated framework. The raw material <<net>> marginal revenue curve of the buying side was viewed as the market total demand curve for the raw material, while the selling side's raw material producing marginal cost curve, was viewed as the total supply curve. The overall equilibrium is discussed algebraically and diagrammatically. The latter method was found to be very helpful in deriving several interesting and consistent propositions. The impact of the side's leadership, varying from zero to its full strength, on its own choice set and on the other side's choice set is in- vestigated. The impact of the reduction in the side's polistic or sonistic power falls mainly on the big producers, or big buyers, of the side. This partial analysis is resumed in Part III of the dissertation where the im- pact of the vertical integration and the percentage depletion allowance, as a characterizing feature of the oil industry, on each side's choice set are dis- cussed. The advantage of vertical integration lies in the fact that it enables the firm to avoid the reduction in its profit which results from the prevalence of po- listic power on the selling side. In a single vertically integrated firm industry, the marginal cost of the used raw material coincides with the marginal cost of producing the raw material, while the raw material marginal revenue coincides with the raw material <<net>> marginal revenue. A model where the integrated firm is a net buyer is then developed. We argued that such a firm has two na- ture: as a user and as a producer, and since it is a net buyer it is not a seller, of the raw material. As a user, it aims at maximizing its profit from this process; therefore it is interested in low crude oil prices. As a producer, it aims at max- imizing its profit from this process; therefore it is interested in high curde pri- ces. Thus there will be a contradiction in interests, but being integrated the firm would select the alternative which yields the highest net total profit. The analy-
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